BEGIN:VCALENDAR
CALSCALE:GREGORIAN
VERSION:2.0
METHOD:PUBLISH
PRODID:-//Drupal iCal API//EN
X-WR-TIMEZONE:America/New_York
BEGIN:VTIMEZONE
TZID:America/New_York
BEGIN:DAYLIGHT
TZOFFSETFROM:-0500
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=3;BYDAY=2SU
DTSTART:20070311T020000
TZNAME:EDT
TZOFFSETTO:-0400
END:DAYLIGHT
BEGIN:STANDARD
TZOFFSETFROM:-0400
RRULE:FREQ=YEARLY;BYMONTH=11;BYDAY=1SU
DTSTART:20071104T020000
TZNAME:EST
TZOFFSETTO:-0500
END:STANDARD
END:VTIMEZONE
BEGIN:VEVENT
SEQUENCE:1
X-APPLE-TRAVEL-ADVISORY-BEHAVIOR:AUTOMATIC
UID:251666
DTSTAMP:20261111T081935Z
DTSTART;TZID=America/New_York:20261119T160000
DTEND;TZID=America/New_York:20261119T165000
URL;TYPE=URI:https://www.wpi.edu/news/calendar/events/ece-graduate-seminar-
 lecture-speaker-professor-dean-sullivan-university-new-hampshire
SUMMARY:ECE Graduate Seminar Lecture\, Speaker: Professor Dean Sullivan\, U
 niversity of New Hampshire
DESCRIPTION:Title:\nFinding and Fixing Security Gaps Between Hardware and S
 oftware\nAbstract:\nComputing systems rely on abstractions that allow hard
 ware and software to be designed and understood separately. These abstract
 ions make complex systems manageable\, but they can also conceal behavior 
 that matters to security. A feature intended to simplify debugging can cre
 ate an unexpected attack path\, while a mechanism intended to isolate soft
 ware can make that software difficult to test.\nThis talk examines how we 
 identify and address security gaps at the boundary between hardware and so
 ftware. Drawing on research in embedded and architectural security\, I wil
 l discuss how hardware features can undermine software protections and als
 o provide new ways to observe execution and discover vulnerabilities. Thes
 e examples motivate emerging work on automated repair of hardware designs 
 and firmware\, raising fundamental questions about what a repair must pres
 erve and what evidence supports its correctness.\nThroughout the talk\, I 
 will emphasize the reasoning that turns these problems into research direc
 tions\, from questioning an accepted assumption to designing an experiment
  and interpreting the limits of its results. The goal is to connect attack
  discovery\, systematic testing\, and repair through a common question: ho
 w can we make security claims precise enough to test and use the resulting
  evidence to build more dependable systems?\n\n\n  \n\n\nSpeaker:\nDean Su
 llivan\nAssistant Professor\, Department of Electrical and Computer Engine
 ering\, University of New Hampshire\nBio:\nDean Sullivan is an Assistant P
 rofessor in the Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering at the U
 niversity of New Hampshire. His research spans computer architecture\, sys
 tems security\, and embedded computing\, with an emphasis on understanding
  and addressing vulnerabilities that arise from interactions between hardw
 are and software. His work includes architectural attacks and defenses\, h
 ardware-assisted software testing\, and automated repair of hardware desig
 ns and firmware. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Engineering from the Un
 iversity of Florida in 2021\, and his M.S. in Computer Engineering and B.S
 . in Electrical Engineering from the University of Central Florida. His wo
 rk has received Best Paper Awards at the Design Automation Conference in 2
 015 and IEEE AsianHOST in 2023\, and a Distinguished Paper Award at the IE
 EE Symposium on Security and Privacy in 2022.\nHost: Professor John McNeil
 l
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR